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There has been a considerable amount of interest in recent years on the robustness of networks
to failures. Many previous studies have concentrated on the effects of node and edge removals
on the connectivity structure of a static network; the networks are considered to be static in the
sense that no compensatory measures are allowed for recovery of the original structure. Real world
networks such as the world wide web, however, are not static and experience a considerable amount
of turnover, where nodes and edges are both added and deleted. Considering degree-based node
removals, we examine the possibility of preserving networks from these types of disruptions. We
recover the original degree distribution by allowing the network to react to the attack by introducing
new nodes and attaching their edges via specially tailored schemes. We focus particularly on the
case of non-uniform failures, a subject that has received little attention in the context of evolving
networks. Using a combination of analytical techniques and numerical simulations, we demonstrate
how to preserve the exact degree distribution of the studied networks from various forms of attack.
Recent years have witnessed a substantial amount of
interest within the physics community in the proper-
ties of networks [1, 2, 3]. Techniques from statistical
physics coupled with the widespread availability of com-
puting resources have facilitated studies ranging from
large scale empirical analysis of the worldwide web, social
networks, biological systems, to the development of theo-
retical models and tools to explore the various properties
of these systems [4, 5, 6].
A relatively large body of work has been devoted to the
study of degree distributions of networks, focusing both
on their measurement, and formulation of theories to ex-
plain their emergence and their effects on various proper-
ties such as resilience and percolation. These studies are
mostly aimed at networks in the real world that evolve
naturally, in the sense that they are driven by dynami-
cal processes not under our control. Representative ex-
amples being social, biological networks and information
networks like the world wide web, which though man-
made, grows in a distributed fashion. There are however
different classes of infrastructure related networks such
as the transportation and power grids, communication
networks such as the telephone and internet, that evolve
under the direction of a centrally controlled authority.
In addition to these is a relatively new class of net-
works which fall in between these two types, the classic
example being peer-to-peer file-sharing networks. These
networks grow in a collaborative, distributed fashion, so
that we have no direct influence over their structure.
However, we can manipulate some of the rules by which
these form, giving us a limited but potentially useful
influence over their properties. It is a well established
fact, that the structure of such networks is directly re-
lated to their performance. In view of this, a certain
degree of effort has been made to tailor these designer
networks towards structures that optimize certain prop-
erties such as robustness to removal of nodes and efficient
information transfer among other things [7, 8]. These
networks typically experience a significant amount of ver-
tex/edge turnover, with users joining and leaving the net-
work voluntarily, possible failures of key components and
resources, or intentional attacks such as Denial of Service.
These factors can lead to severe disruption of the network
structure and as a result, loss of its key properties. In the
face of this, it is natural to extend our analysis to the ef-
fects of these failures/attacks and use our limited control
to attempt to adaptively restore the original structure of
these networks.
Previous work has focused on the effects of disruption
on static networks, where authors have studied the con-
nectivity structure under the random/targeted removal
of nodes and edges [9, 10, 11]. The network is consid-
ered static in that no compensatory measures, such as
the introduction of new edges or nodes, are permitted.
The effect of these removals have been measured against
the existence of the giant component : the largest set of
vertices in the network of O(n), where n is the number of
nodes, that are connected to each other by at least one
path. A representative example can be found in the paper
by Albert et al [12], where they studied the size of the gi-
ant component of scale free networks such as the internet,
under simulated random failures and targeted attacks on
high degree nodes. One of the interesting things they
found was that, while these networks were remarkably
robust to random failures, they were extremely fragile
to targeted attacks. This emphasizes the importance of
non-uniform removal strategies.
Unlike in the static case, the networks considered in
this paper evolve in time with sustained node and edge
removals. The network is allowed to react to these dis-
ruptions via the introduction of new nodes and edges,
chosen to be attached in a manner such that the network
retains it original form, at least in terms of the degree
distribution. Such models, conventionally referred to in
the literature as reactive networks have been discussed
before, see [13, 14] for instance. Here we assume that the
designers of the network are only aware of the statistical
properties of the removed nodes and have no ability to
influence the existing network beyond the introduction
of new nodes or reattachment of those removed. Conse-
2quently they have two processes under their control to
compensate for the attack. The first is the degree of
the introduced vertices and the second is the process by
which a newly introduced vertex chooses to attach to a
previously extant vertex on the network. Failure is thus
compensated by adding nodes and edges chosen from an
appropriate degree distribution and attaching them to
the network via specially tailored schemes. Note that in
our model, one can re-introduce nodes that have been
removed or introduce completely new sets of nodes. The
former case could be indicative of say a computer in a
peer-to-peer network that loses its connection, and would
like to reconnect. The latter could represent the perma-
nent loss of web-pages from the world wide web and the
introduction of a new web-page. We use the attachment
kernel of Krapivsky and Redner [15], to simulate the in-
troduction of nodes and edges, and via the introduction
of a deletion kernel we analyze the interesting and ne-
glected case of non-uniform deletion.
A variety of models have been proposed to simulate
network evolution and growth where vertices are both
added and deleted [16, 17, 18, 19, 20], but these have
concentrated on the relatively simple case of uniform
deletion. We will show that under uniform failures, the
appearance of degree-degree correlations, that typically
arise as a result of growth processes, as discussed in [2],
can be neglected. Previous models have taken advan-
tage of precisely this fact to circumvent the difficulty of
dealing with degree-degree correlations. For the case of
non-uniform deletion, correlations cannot be ignored. In
this paper we confront this issue by demonstrating how
to preserve an initially uncorrelated network throughout
the evolution process with the introduction of an addi-
tional rate equation for the degree-degree correlations.
We give analytical results and numerical simulations for
a variety of degree distributions under various forms of
attack. In all the cases that we study, we recover the
exact degree distributions.
I. THE MODEL
Consider a network which evolves under the removal
and addition of vertices. In each unit of time we add 1
vertex and remove r vertices. Removal of a vertex also
implies that all the edges incident on that vertex van-
ish and consequently the degree of vertices at the end of
those edges decrease. Here r can be interpreted as the
ratio of vertices removed to those added, so r < 1 rep-
resents a growing network, r > 1 a shrinking one, while
r = 1 implies vertex turnover but fixed network size. The
equations to follow represent the completely general case.
However, for the purposes of this paper we will special-
ize to networks of constant size as we assume that the
network already exists and we would like to preserve its
original structure, by balancing the rate of attack against
the rate of repair.
Let pk be the fraction of nodes in the network that at
a given time have degree k. By definition then it has the
normalization:
∑
k
pk = 1. (1)
In addition to this we would like to have freedom over
the degree of the incoming vertex. Let mk be the prob-
ability distribution governing this, with the constraint∑
k kmk = c. We also have to consider how a newly ar-
riving vertex chooses to attach to other vertices extant in
the network and how a vertex is removed from the same.
Let pik be the probability that a given edge from a new
node is connected to a node of degree k, multiplied by
the total number of nodes n. Then pikpk is the probabil-
ity that an edge from a new node is connected to some
node of degree k. Similarly, let ak be the probability
that a given node with degree k fails or is attacked dur-
ing one node removal also multiplied by n. Then akpk is
the total probability to remove a node with degree k dur-
ing one node removal. Note that the introduction of the
deletion kernel ak is what sets our model apart from pre-
vious models describing the network evolution process.
Since each newly attached edge goes to some vertex with
degree k, we have the following normalization conditions:
∑
k pikpk = 1, (2)∑
k akpk = 1. (3)
A. Rate Equation
Armed with the given definitions and building on the
work done previously by [19], we are now in a position to
write down a rate equation governing the evolution of the
degree distribution. For a network of n nodes at a given
unit of time, the total number of nodes with degree k is
npk. After one unit of time we add one vertex and take
away r vertices, so the number is (n+1− r)p′k, where p
′
k
is the new value of pk. Therefore we have,
(n+ 1− r)p′k = npk
+ cpik−1pk−1
− cpikpk
+ r
∑
j
ek+1|jjajpj
− r
∑
j
ek|jjajpj
− rakpk +mk, (4)
where ek|j is the conditional probability of following an
edge from a node of degree j and reaching a node of
degree k. Alternatively, it is the degree distribution of
nodes at the end of an edge emanating from a node of
degree j. Note that e0|j and ej|0 are always zero, and
for an uncorrelated network, ek|j = kpk/〈k〉. The terms
3involving pik describe the flow of vertices with degree k−1
to k and k to k + 1 as a consequence of edges gained
due to the addition of new vertices. The first two terms
involving aj describes the flow of vertices with degree
k + 1 to k and k to k − 1 as vertices lose edges as a
result of losing neighbors. The term −rakpk represents
the direct removal of a node of degree k at rate r. Finally
mk represents the addition of a vertex with degree k.
Processes where vertices gain or lose two or more edges
vanish in the limit of large n and are not included in
Eq. (4).
The rate equation described above presents a
formidable challenge due to the appearance of ek|j from
the terms representing deleted edges from lost neigh-
bors. Rate equations for recovery schemes based on edge
rewiring are slightly easier to deal with. Upon failure, all
edges connected to that node are rewired so that the de-
grees of the deleted node’s neighbors do not change, and
this term does not appear. The specific case of prefer-
ential failure in power-law networks was considered pre-
viously in this context by [14]. However, this recovery
protocol can only be used on strictly growing networks,
because a network of constant size would become dense
under its application. Moreover, it is dependent on the
power-law structure of the network. The methods de-
scribed here are general and are applicable to arbitrary
degree distributions.
Apart from edge rewiring, the special case of random
deletion also leads to a significant simplification. Uniform
deletion amounts to setting ak = 1. Doing so, then leads
to the following,
∑
j
ek|jjpj = kpk, (5)
which renders Eq. (4) independent of ek|l and thus in-
dependent of any degree-degree correlations. Random
deletion hence closes equation (4) for pk, enabling us to
seek a solution for the degree distribution for a given mk
and pik. With non-uniform deletion, the degree distribu-
tion depends on a two-point probability distribution, and
as we shall see in Section II B, the two-point probability
distribution will depend on the three-point probability
distribution and so on. This hierarchy of distributions,
where the n-point distribution depends on the n + 1-
point distribution, is not closed under non-uniform fail-
ure and hence it is difficult to seek an exact solution for
the degree distribution. Nevertheless, in the following,
we demonstrate a method that allows us to navigate our
way around this problem.
As mentioned before, for the purposes of this paper we
will be interested in a network of constant size, where the
rate of attack is compensated by the rate of repair. As-
suming that the network reaches (or already is) a station-
ary distribution and does not possess degree-degree cor-
relations, we set r = 1 and can further simplify Eq. (4).
Let 〈k〉a be the mean degree of nodes removed from the
network (i.e. 〈k〉a =
∑
k kakpk), and 〈k〉 the mean degree
of the original degree distribution pk. Then we have,
0 = cpik−1pk−1
− cpikpk + (k + 1)
〈k〉a
〈k〉
pk+1
− k
〈k〉a
〈k〉
pk − akpk +mk. (6)
The evolution process, specifically non-uniform removal
of nodes, can and in many cases will introduce degree-
degree correlations into our networks. In order to con-
front this issue, we will first find choices for mk and
pik that satisfy the solutions to the rate equation, for
a given pk, in a network that is uncorrelated. We will
then demonstrate that a special subset of those solutions
for mk and pik is an uncorrelated fixed point of the rate
equation for the degree-degree correlations. This opens
up the possibility, that a network that initially has no
degree-degree correlations will not develop correlations
from the evolution process.
Although the rate equation described in Eq. (6) is fairly
complicated, it is a relatively straightforward exercise to
determine the relation between edges added to those re-
moved. Multiplying Eq. (6) by k, summing over k and
rearranging yields 〈k〉a = c. This equation is simple to
interpret. Since the network has a constant fixed-point
degree distribution, the average degree of the network
remains constant, and therefore edges are removed and
added at the the same rate.
II. RECOVERY FROM ATTACKS
In this section we describe our method under which
networks can recover from various forms of attack. The
types of attack we consider are those studied generally by
most authors (though in static networks), namely pref-
erential and targeted attacks.
Random failures are the most generally studied
schemes in both static and evolving networks, in view
of the fact that they lend themselves to relatively sim-
ple analysis. These types of failures may be representa-
tive, say, of disruption of power lines or transformers in a
power grid owing to extraneous factors such as weather.
However, the functionality of most networks often de-
pends on the performance of higher degree nodes, conse-
quently non-uniform attack schemes focus on these. For
example, in a peer-to-peer network, a high degree node
could be a central user with large amounts of data. High
degree could also be indicative of the amount of load on
a node during its operation, or on the public visibility of
a person in a social network. It is reasonable to assume
that a malicious entity such as a computer virus is more
likely to strike these important nodes. Holme et al [21]
have employed this removal strategy (among others) on
a variety of simulated and real networks and have found
it to be highly effective in disrupting the structure of the
attacked network.
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FIG. 1: Degree distribution of a Poisson network (104 nodes)
with mean µ = 10, under preferential attack ak ∝ k and
uniform attachment pik = 1 using mk = akpk.
We simulate these kinds of attacks using preferen-
tial failure ak ∝ k, that sample nodes in proportion
to their number of connections, and through an out-
right attack on the highest degree nodes represented by
ak ∝ θ(k − kmin), where θ(x) is the Heaviside step func-
tion. Our method of compensation will involve control
over two processes: the first where our newly incom-
ing/repaired vertex chooses a degree for itself drawn from
some distribution mk, and second, the process by which
this vertex decides to attach to any other vertex in the
network, governed by the attachment kernel pik.
A. Using mk and the attachment kernel pik
Our goal here is to solve for the attachment kernel pik,
that will preserve the original probability distribution pk,
subject to a deletion kernel ak for some choice ofmk. We
will assume that the final network is uncorrelated and
work with Eq. (6), keeping in mind that any arbitrary
choice of mk and pik is probably not consistent with that
assumption.
Introducing the cumulative distribution for the at-
tacked and newly added vertices, Ak andMk respectively,
Ak =
∞∑
l=k
alpl, Mk =
∞∑
l=k
ml, (7)
we sum Eq. (6) from k = k′+1 to∞, noting that 〈k〉a = c
for our steady state network. This leads to the following
relation,
pikpk =
(k + 1)pk+1
〈k〉
+
Ak+1 −Mk+1
c
. (8)
Dividing both sides by pk gives us an expression for the
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FIG. 2: Degree distribution of a Poisson network (104 nodes)
with µ = 10, under high degree attack ak ∝ Θ(k − 12) and
uniform attachment pik = 1 using mk = akpk.
attachment kernel,
pik =
1
pk
[
(k + 1)pk+1
〈k〉
+
Ak+1 −Mk+1
c
]
.
(9)
Equation (9) represents the set of possible solutions for
the attachment kernel that will lead to the desired degree
distribution, given that the final network is uncorrelated.
The correct choice of solution from the above set, must
obey the consistency condition, that when inserted into
the rate equation for the degree-degree correlations, the
correlations vanish. In Section II B, we will show that
the following ansatz chosen from the above set is such a
choice:
mk = akpk,
pik =
(k + 1)pk+1
〈k〉 pk
. (10)
Equation (10) was previously derived by [8] for the case
of random deletion. Here we posit that it works more
generally for the case of non-uniform attack when our
initial network is uncorrelated (with some caveats that
will be explained shortly).
The choice of pik makes intuitive sense because the
quantity (k + 1)pk+1/ 〈k〉 is the probability distribution
governing the number of edges belonging to a node,
reached by following a randomly chosen edge to one of
its ends, not including the edge that was followed. This
is one less than the total degree of the node and is also
referred to as the excess degree distribution. Note that
in our model we specify the degree of incoming nodes.
Therefore the appearance of the excess degree distribu-
tion is a signature of an uncorrelated network, implying
the newly arriving edges are being introduced in an un-
correlated fashion.
There are basically two conditions for the existence of
a solution given by Eq. (10); akpk must be a valid proba-
bility distribution, and 〈k〉 must be finite. These are not
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FIG. 3: Degree distribution of an exponential network (104
nodes) with λ = 0.4 under targeted attack ak ∝ Θ(k − 5)
using pik from Eq. (10) after setting mk = akpk.
very stringent conditions and are typically satisfied by
most degree distributions. In other words, barring some
pathological cases, it is always possible to find a solution
of the form of Eq. (10). There is an additional consider-
ation, the deletion process may lead to nodes of degree
zero in a network that originally did not have any such
nodes. While the fraction of such nodes is vanishingly
small for networks with say, Poisson degree distributions,
they may be non-trivial for power-law networks. As such,
it is important to set pi0 (the probability to attach to a
node of degree zero) to a generous value in order to re-
connect these nodes to the network.
We are now in a position to effect our repair on the
network. Given the original degree distribution pk and
the form of the attack ak, Eq. (10) gives us the precise
recipe for recovering the degree distribution. We need
to sample the degrees of the newly introduced nodes in
proportion to the product of the deletion kernel and the
degree distribution, and then attach these edges in pro-
portion to the excess degree distribution of the network.
To test our repair method, we provide four examples for
initially uncorrelated networks with 10, 000 nodes gener-
ated using the configuration model [22, 23]. In the config-
uration model, only the degrees of vertices are specified,
apart from this sole constraint the connections between
vertices are made at random.
The simulation results show the initial degree distri-
bution and the compensated one subject to two types of
attacks on Poissonian networks with degree distribution
given by,
pk =
e−µµ−k
k!
. (11)
In Fig. 1 we show the resulting degree distribution
where nodes were attacked preferentially, i.e. ak ∝ k,
while in Fig. 2 we show the case for targeted attack only
on high degree nodes represented by ak ∝ Θ(k − kmin)
where kmin is the minimum degree of the node attacked.
The degrees of newly added nodes were chosen from the
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FIG. 4: Log-binned degree distribution of a power law net-
work (104 nodes) with exponent γ = 3 and exponential cutoff
κ = 100, under preferential attack ak ∝ k using pik from
Eq. (10) after setting mk = akpk.
distribution akpk with the attachment kernel pik set to
one, corresponding to the solution of equation (10) after
substituting in the appropriate pk. The data points in all
the figures are averaged over multiple realizations of the
network each subject to 105 iterations of addition and
deletion. The points along with corresponding error bars
represent the final degree distribution, whereas the solid
line represents the initial network. As the figures show,
the final networks are in excellent agreement with the
initial degree distribution.
We employ the same attack kernels, ak ∝ k and a tar-
geted attack only on high degree nodes represented by
ak ∝ Θ(k−kmin) on two other examples. Our first exam-
ple network has links distributed according to a power-
law with an exponential cutoff,
pk =
{
Ck−γe−k/κ k 6= 0,
0 k = 0
(12)
C is a normalization constant which in this case is
1/Liγ(e
−1/κ), where the function Liν(z) is the poly-
logarithm function defined as:
Liv(z) =
∞∑
k=1
zk
kν
. (13)
The exponential cut-off has been introduced for three
reasons. First, many real world networks appear to show
this cutoff [24] and second, it renders the distribution
normalizable for ranges of the exponent γ ≤ 2. Finally,
for a pure power-law network it is in principle possible to
assign a degree to a node that is greater than the system
size. The exponential cutoff ensures that the probabil-
ity for this to happen is vanishingly small. In the other
examples that we consider, the functional form of the
distribution already ensures this property.
The second network has an exponential distribution
6given by,
pk = (1− e
−λ)e−λk. (14)
Fig. 3 shows the results for the exponentially dis-
tributed network (λ = 0.4) undergoing targeted attack.
In Fig. 4 we show the resulting degree distribution for
the power-law network (γ = 3 and κ = 100) where nodes
were attacked preferentially. Both figures indicate the
initial and final networks are in excellent agreement.
At this point, aside from the technical details, it is
worth reminding ourselves of the big picture. We have
demonstrated above that if a network with a certain de-
gree structure is subjected to an attack that aims to
destabilize that structure, one can recover the same, by
manipulating the rules by which vertices are introduced
to the network. The rules that we employ in our repair
method are dependent on the types of attacks that our
networks are subject to. In the following section we give
a detailed justification of the employment of our method.
B. Neglecting degree-degree correlations
In order for our results from the previous sections to
be valid, we must demonstrate that our initially uncor-
related networks remain uncorrelated under our repair
scheme. To accomplish this, we will define a rate equa-
tion for the degree-degree correlations and demonstrate
that the uncorrelated network is a fixed point of this
equation. Our rate equation will describe the evolution
of the expected number of edges in the network with ends
of degree k and l.
Let the expected number of such edges in the network
be,
mel,k, (15)
where m = n〈k〉/2 , and el,k is the probability that a
randomly selected edge has degree k at one end and de-
gree l in the other. The expected number of edges after
one time step where we add c and take away 〈k〉a edges
is then,
[m+ c− 〈k〉a]e
′
l,k = mel,k +∆, (16)
where ∆ represents all other edge addition and removal
processes.
We have already established that in the steady state
case, 〈k〉a = c irrespective of the degree distribution, so
our goal is equivalent to showing that ∆ is equal to zero
for an uncorrelated network generated/repaired with our
special choices of pik and mk. As a result e
′
k,l = ek,l, im-
plying that the degree-degree correlations (if any) remain
constant over time.
We will assume that our network is locally tree-like,
something which holds true for most random graphs. In
addition we will only consider processes out to second
nearest-neighbors of a node. These assumptions allows us
to avoid including terms in the rate equation representing
removal of nodes with neighbors that are connected to
each other. Nevertheless, there are a large number of
remaining processes that we will need to consider.
To start things off, note that the rate equation is sym-
metric in the indices l and k. Any process that con-
tributes to changing k while holding l constant also con-
tributes to changing l while holding k constant. We can
therefore consider contributions to ∆ from ek−1,l, ek,l and
ek+1,l and add on the corresponding symmetric terms
at the end. The first process we need to take into ac-
count is a direct addition of a node of degree l. This
contributes two flows to the rate equation, lpik−1pk−1ml
and −lpikpkml. Similarly, the direct deletion of a node of
degree l contributes −lek|lalpl and lek+1|lalpl. Next, we
will have to take into account second nearest-neighbor
processes. We can be certain that these terms are of the
same order by merely counting the number of unsummed
probability distributions that go into each process. There
will be two terms for the attachment process representing
the situation where a new node of any degree attaches to
a node of degree k or k− 1, that was previously attached
to a node of degree l. These terms are −ckel|kpikpk and
c(k − 1)el|k−1pik−1pk−1. Similarly there are two removal
processes, where a node of any degree that is removed
from the network was previously attached to a node of
degree k or k+1 that has neighbor(s) of degree l. Unfor-
tunately these terms introduce three-point correlations
into the rate equation. Analogous to methods employed
in similar hierarchy problems, we use a moment-closure
approximation to represent these processes as a product
of two two-point correlations in the following manner,
−
∑
j
(k− 1)el|kek|jjajpj +
∑
j
kel|k+1ek+1|jjajpj . (17)
Adding all of these terms together our final equation
for ∆ is,
∆ = lpik−1pk−1ml − lpikpkml + lek+1|lalpl − lek|lalpl
+ c(k − 1)el|k−1pik−1pk−1 − ckel|kpikpk
+
∑
j
kel|k+1ek+1|jjajpj −
∑
j
(k − 1)el|kek|jjajpj ,
(18)
in addition to terms where l and k are interchanged.
After inserting the appropriate pik and mk from
Eq. (10) along with the uncorrelated solution ek|l =
kpk/〈k〉, it can be shown that,
∆ = 0. (19)
According to Eq. (16), there exist a set of solutions such
that an initially uncorrelated network will not develop
any degree-degree correlations as a consequence of the
evolution process. The attachment kernel that was em-
ployed in the network evolution process, described in Sec-
tion II A, was a subset of these solutions. This allowed
7the repair method to be employed by maintaining negli-
gible correlations in the network.
One must point out, that we have not explicitly demon-
strated the stability of the uncorrelated solution to per-
turbations. For example fluctuations in ek,l or in the
number of edges may drive the network away from the
uncorrelated steady-state. An analytical approach to de-
termine this, say using linear stability analysis is difficult,
due to the numerous related probability distributions in-
volved. So instead we resort to a numerical approach.
We measured the Pearson correlation coefficient between
the degrees of nodes at both ends of an edge for all our
model networks. For the Poisson and exponential cases,
the correlations remained negligible during the evolution
process. On the other hand, the power-law network de-
veloped non-trivial correlations. We have not been able
to determine whether the appearance of these correla-
tions was due to finite-size effects, or instability in the
uncorrelated solution, or to some other cause. The re-
sults show that the agreement between the initial and
final degree distributions is very good, and it seems that
in this particular case, the correlations did not demon-
strate a significant effect on the final state of the network.
III. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have shown how to preserve a net-
work’s degree distribution from various forms of attack
or failures by allowing it to adapt via the simple manipu-
lation of rules that govern the introduction of nodes and
edges. We based our analysis on a rate equation describ-
ing the evolution of the network under arbitrary schemes
of addition and deletion. In addition to choosing the
degree of incoming nodes, we allow ourselves to choose
how nodes attach to the existing network. To deal with
the special case of non-uniform deletion we have intro-
duced a rate equation for the evolution of degree-degree
correlations and have used that in combination with the
equation for the degree distribution to come to our so-
lution. We have provided examples of the applicability
of this method using a combination of analytical tech-
niques and numerical simulations on a variety of degree
distributions, yielding excellent results in each case.
The structure of many networks in the real world is
crucially related to their performance. Many authors
have seized on the fact that technological networks such
as the internet and peer-to-peer networks are power-law
in nature, and have used this to design efficient search
schemes among other things. Loss of structural prop-
erties of these networks then lead to severe constraints
on their performance. Recent empirical studies [25] have
suggested that node removal, for example, in the world
wide web, is typically non-uniform in nature. In view of
this, it is crucial for researchers to come up with effective
solutions to try and manage these types of disruptions.
To the best of our knowledge, there is a considerable
gap in understanding the non-uniform deletion process
of nodes and edges and corresponding methods to deal
with them. This paper begins to address this gap.
It must be pointed out that the methods we have de-
scribed depends crucially on the assumption of negligible
correlations as the network evolves. Curiously enough,
in our example power-law network, we were able to get
very good agreement between the initial and final degree
distributions, in spite of the appearance of non-trivial
correlations. It will certainly be interesting to see if our
methods can be extended to the case of networks with
strong correlations, and other metrics describing network
structure. Perhaps it is possible to directly confront the
rate equation for the degree-degree correlations, although
this seems a difficult prospect at the moment. The idea
of preserving the structure of networks from attacks by
allowing it to react in real-time is a relatively nascent
one and the authors look forward to more developments
in this area.
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